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AbstrAct: This article presents a critical approach to the position of 
the European Court of Human Rights on the admissibility of evidence 
(recorded statements) obtained as a result of “private torture or inhuman 
treatment”, while such recordings were produced outside of and for 
purposes other than the criminal proceedings. In accordance with the 
recent judgment of the Court (case Ćwik v. Poland), the use of this 
evidence in the criminal proceedings conducted against a third party, 
not against a tortured person, renders such proceedings as a whole 
automatically unfair, in breach of Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. In the author’s opinion, the ECtHR does not attach 
adequate importance to the fact that the use of such evidence cannot 
have any impact on the scope or level of protection against torture or 
other forms of cruel treatment, provided in the framework of criminal 
proceedings. It is argued in this paper that recorded statements produced 
prior to criminal proceedings and not for purposes of those proceedings 
by private individuals, without the instigation, consent, or acquiescence 
1 Professor at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland; Head of De-
partment of Criminal Procedure; judge of the Supreme Court of Poland (Crimi-
nal Chamber). PhD in Law.
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of public officials, by methods contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, 
shall be admissible evidence. Consequently, the European Court 
should not have questioned the admissibility of such evidence, 
but rather assess the fairness of criminal proceedings as a whole. 
Keywords: criminal proceedings; admissibility of evidence; torture; 
European Convention on Human Rights, fair trial.
resumo: Este artigo apresenta uma análise crítica da posição firmada pelo 
Tribunal Europeu de Direitos Humanos sobre a admissibilidade da prova (de-
clarações gravadas) obtidas como resultado de “tortura privada ou tratamento 
inumano”, quando essa gravação tenha sido produzida fora de um processo 
criminal e não a ele direcionada. Conforme a visão do Tribunal, recentemente 
assentada (caso Ćwik v. Poland), o uso dessa prova em um processo criminal 
conduzido contra terceira pessoa, não contra a pessoa torturada, acarreta que 
esse processo seja automaticamente considerado injusto, em violação do art. 
6 da Convenção Europeia de Direitos Humanos. Sustenta-se que a decisão 
do Tribunal não ponderou adequadamente a importância do fato de que o 
uso dessa prova não pode ter qualquer impacto na finalidade ou no nível de 
proteção contra a tortura ou outras formas de tratamento cruel, conforme 
as diretrizes do processo penal. Afirma-se que as declarações gravadas 
produzidas por indivíduos privados, sem o consentimento ou autorização 
de agentes públicos, anteriormente ao processo penal e não a ele dirigidas, 
por métodos contrários ao artigo 3 da Convenção devem ser consideradas 
provas admissíveis. Consequentemente, o Tribunal Europeu não deveria ter 
questionado a admissibilidade dessa prova, mas verificado a adequação do 
processo penal em sua integralidade às diretrizes do justo processo.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: processo penal; admissibilidade da prova; tortura; Tribunal 
Europeu de Direitos Humanos; processo justo. 
introduction
The article aims to answer the question of whether under 
Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms2 criminal proceedings can be considered fair if 
2 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, adopted on 4 November 1950. Hereafter referred to as 
“the Convention” or “ECHR”.
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they rely on statements obtained outside the proceedings through torture 
or inhuman treatment conducted only by “private individuals” and not 
through investigative authorities or other public officials involved in 
obtaining them. Accordingly, the study seeks to assess the admissibility of 
evidentiary use of recorded statements (declarations), expressed during 
private interrogations as a result of the aforesaid unlawful methods, if such 
records were subsequently secured, or obtained by investigative authorities 
through lawful activities. The level of protection from torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment to be ensured by investigative or 
judicial authorities in criminal proceedings is fundamental in addressing 
this question. Consequently, a few specific questions can be framed: 
does the standard of fair criminal proceedings only prohibit the use of 
evidence obtained in violation of Article 3 of the Convention by public 
officials, upon their consent or acquiescence or by other person acting 
in an official capacity, or does the prohibition also extend to evidence 
obtained by private individuals, as long as such evidence is collected with 
the intent of using it in pending or future criminal proceedings? Finally, 
there is the most far-reaching question of whether evidentiary use of 
recorded statements obtained by private individuals outside of and other 
than for the purpose of use in criminal proceedings would violate the 
standard of fairness of the proceedings. 
In order to answer the above questions, it is essential to determine 
the subjective scope of application of such evidence, namely whether 
recorded statements forced in private acts of torture or inhuman treatment 
are intended as evidence in proceedings against the person who made 
the statement or against a third party. In the author’s view, the use of 
such evidence in proceedings against the victim of treatment contrary 
to Article 3 ECHR would undermine his/her right to silence. 
However, it is argued in this paper that the European standard 
of fair trial does not prohibit the use of such tainted evidence (recording 
of private interrogations) in the proceedings conducted against a third 
person if it is obtained outside those proceedings and not for the purposes 
of those proceedings. 
Having analyzed the aforesaid problems will help tackle a more 
general question: Is there a European standard already established in this 
area, or is it yet to be fully developed?
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The article consists of two main chapters. The first one concerns 
the admissibility of evidence obtained by public officials in violation of 
Article 3 of the Convention. In this section the European standard on this 
issue is also compared to universal one, stemming from UN international 
treaties. The second chapter focuses on the admissibility of statements 
obtained under the same prohibited methods but by private individuals. 
This section also contains a critical analysis of the judgment of the ECtHR 
delivered in the Ćwik v. Poland case as well as reasons put forward in 
the joint dissenting opinion of two judges attached to this judgment. In 
the end, the author presents his own concept of assessing the fairness 
of criminal proceedings in which the court relied on private evidence 
obtained in the circumstances occurring in Ćwik v. Poland. 
1. rEstrictions on adMissibility of EvidEncE obtainEd by 
public officials in violation of articlE 3 Echr
Neither the Convention nor any other international agreement 
concluded between the member states of the Council of Europe regulates 
the admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings. The European 
Court of Human Rights3 has repeatedly held that the issue of admissibility 
of evidence in criminal proceedings is beyond its assessment capability 
when examining complaints regarding a fair criminal trial guaranteed 
under Article 6 ECHR. Therefore, any use of an illegally obtained 
evidence in criminal proceedings should result in the assessment of 
the fairness of the proceedings as a whole rather than the assessment 
of admissibility of such evidence.4 Despite this general declaration, 
the Court makes an exception for evidence obtained in violation of 
prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
expressed in Article 3 ECHR. The case-law of the ECtHR concerning 
3 Hereafter referred to as “ECtHR” or “the Court”. 
4 ECtHR judgment of 12th July 1988, Schenk v. Switzerland, appl. no. 10862/84, 
§ 46; ECtHR [Grand Chamber] judgment of 10th March 2009, Bykov v. Rus-
sia, appl. no. 4378/02, §§ 88-90. See also: HOFMAŃSKI, Piotr; WRÓBEL, 
Andrzej, Artykuł 6. In: GARLICKI Lech (org.). Konwencja o ochronie praw 
człowieka i podstawowych wolności. Tom I. Komentarz do artykułów 1-18, War-
saw: C.H. Beck Publishing, 2010. p. 338. 
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the fairness of criminal proceedings that use evidence (explanations or 
testimonies) obtained by investigative authorities (public officials) in 
violation of the prohibition set forth in Article 3 ECHR is fairly abundant 
and relatively consistent. The ECtHR firmly and clearly holds that the use 
of statements extracted by torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
invariably renders the proceedings unfair, regardless of the significance 
of the evidence for the determination of the facts in the case.5 In the 
case of Jalloh v. Germany, the Court proved the above thesis, arguing 
that “any other conclusion would only serve to legitimate indirectly 
the sort of morally reprehensible conduct which the authors of Article 
3 of the Convention sought to proscribe or, as it was so well put in the 
United States Supreme Court’s judgment in the Rochin case…, to ‘afford 
brutality the cloak of law.’”6 Only exceptionally, if the person subjected 
to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR remained silent during the 
interrogation (gave no statement), the Court considers charges under 
Article 6 ECHR inadmissible. Thus, the only reason for assessment of 
such a complaint brought under Article 6 ECHR as inadmissible is when 
the interrogated person failed to supply any evidence which could be 
used against him or her in the criminal proceedings.7
Statements obtained through foreign legal assistance for the use 
in the criminal proceedings will also render such proceedings unfair if 
the applicant proves a “real risk” of collecting the evidence in violation of 
Article 3 ECHR.8 That the ill-treatment affected a third party (a witness) 
5 See, inter alia, ECtHR [Grand Chamber] judgment of 11th July 2006, Jalloh v. 
Germany, appl. no. 54810/00, §§ 99, 105; ECtHR [Grand Chamber] judgment 
of 1st June 2010, Gäfgen v. Germany, appl. no. 22978/05, § 166; ECtHR judg-
ment of 11th February 2014, Cĕsnieks v. Latvia, appl. no. 9278/06; §§ 65-66; 
ECtHR [Grand Chamber] judgment of 13th September 2016, Ibrahim and 
Others v. the United Kingdom, appl. nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 
40351/09, § 254. 
6 ECtHR judgment of Jalloh v. Germany, § 105. 
7 ECtHR judgment of 15th October 2019, Mehmet Ali Eser v. Turkey, appl. no. 
1399/07, §§ 41-42. 
8 ECtHR judgment of 25th September 2012, El Haski v. Belgium, appl. no. 
649/08, §§ 81-88. On this issue, see: WĄSEK-WIADEREK, Małgorzata, Mod-
el zakazów dowodowych z perspektywy Konwencji i orzecznictwa ETPCz. 
In: SKORUPKA Jerzy; DROZD Anna (org.). Nowe spojrzenie na model zakazów 
dowodowych w procesie karnym, C.H. Beck Publishing, Warsaw. 2015, p. 26-27. 
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and not a defendant is irrelevant, so is the fact that illegal methods 
of interrogation were employed by officials from another country.9 
Furthermore, the transfer (extradition or deportation) of an individual 
to another criminal jurisdiction for trial runs a risk of “flagrant denial of 
justice” and, therefore, violates Article 6 ECHR if there is a real possibility 
of the person being subjected to criminal proceedings that admit evidence 
obtained by torture or inhuman treatment. Who has been the source of 
the evidence is irrelevant. What is significant is the use of the method 
of interrogation contrary to Article 3 ECHR.10
The Court’s stance on real evidence directly obtained through 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment is less firm. There is no case-
law of the ECtHR on the admissibility of real evidence obtained directly 
through torture. However, in El-Haski v. Belgium case, the Court said, 
although only obiter dictum, that it should be assessed in the same manner 
as statements obtained under torture.11 A different standard seems to 
apply to real evidence obtained through other forms of ill-treatment. In 
the aforesaid case of Jalloh v. Germany, the Court held that the use of such 
evidence did not automatically render the criminal proceedings unfair 
in all circumstances. However, if this is the case, the Court is required 
to assess the fairness of the entire proceedings, taking into account 
the significance of the evidence to the facts, the defendant’s ability to 
challenge its admissibility before the court, as well as the criterion of 
public interest in criminal prosecution.12 Likewise, criminal proceedings 
9 THIENEL, Tobias. The admissibility of evidence obtained by torture under 
international law. European Journal of International Law, v. 17, n. 2, 2006, 
pp. 362-363. 
10 See, ECtHR judgment of 12th February 2012, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. 
United Kingdom, appl. no. 8139/09, §§ 263-287; ECtHR judgment of 24th 
July 2014, Al-Nashiri v. Poland, appl. no. 28761/11, §§ 662-569; ECtHR 
judgment of 24th July 2014, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, appl. no. 
7511/13, §§ 552-561. 
11 ECtHR judgment of 25th September 2012, El Haski v. Belgium, appl. no. 
649/08, § 85.
12 ECtHR judgment of Jalloh v. Germany, §§ 105-108; see also ECtHR judgment 
of 22 October 2020, Bokhonko v. Gorgia, appl. no. 6739/11, §§ 94-99 (in this 
case the main evidence - drugs were extracted from the applicant’s rectum 
during the search constituting ill-treatment in accordance with the appli-
cant’s arguments). 
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are not automatically deemed unfair because of the use of evidence 
collected indirectly through inhuman treatment (the so-called “fruits of 
the poisonous tree”). According to the Court, such a trial may be presumed 
unfair, yet such presumption may be challenged taking into account the 
specific circumstances of the case.13 
All in all, with reference to statements obtained in violation of 
Article 3 ECHR directly by public functionaries, with their consent or 
permission, the European standard is unambiguous: irrespective of the 
procedural setup, the use of such evidence in a criminal trial, as well as 
exposing a person to proceedings in which such evidence can be made 
use of (for example, in case of extradition or expulsion), constitutes a 
violation of Article 6 ECHR. 
Such an interpretation of Article 6 ECHR has much in common 
with the universal standard arising from Articles 1 and 15 of the UN 
Convention against Torture.14 The definition of torture provided therein 
makes clear references to acts “committed by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.” The exclusionary rule expressed in Article 
15 thereof prohibits the use as evidence of any statement made under 
torture in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as 
evidence that such a statement was made. However, the UN Convention 
does not refer this prohibition to evidence obtained as a result of less 
13 ECtHR judgment of Gäfgen v. Germany, §§ 178-188. On the ambiguity of the 
case-law on this issue: JASIŃSKI, Wojciech; CHOJNIAK, Łukasz. The Admis-
sibility of Evidence Obtained by Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment in Criminal Proceedings. Overview of European and Polish Standards. 
In: FENYVESI, Csaba; HERKE Csongor (org.). Pleadings. Celebration Volume 
of Professor Tremmel Florian’s 70th Birthday. 148 Studia Iuridica Auctori-
tate Universitatis Pecs Publicata I (2011). Pecs 2011. pp. 128-130. It is un-
clear whether this standard applies also to real evidence obtained indirectly 
through torture. The case-law does not answer the question whether the real 
evidence shall always be inadmissible, irrespective whether obtained directly 
or indirectly as a result of torture. 
14 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General Assembly Reso-
lution of 10 December 1984. Hereafter referred to as “the UN Convention” 
or “CAT”.
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severe forms of ill-treatment, such as inhuman or degrading treatment.15 In 
this respect, the wording of the UN Convention differs from the soft-law 
1975 UN Torture Declaration.16 Still, given the wording of sentence two of 
Article 16 the UN Convention, some authors argue that for the purposes 
of Article 15 of the same instrument, inhuman treatment should also be 
deemed equivalent to torture. This would mean that also statements forced 
through ill-treatment which is not torture are subject to the exclusionary 
rule contained in this provision.17 This view is not commonly supported 
in the literature.18
Like in the Strasbourg human rights protection system, the 
exclusionary rule set out in Article 15 CAT covers any statements obtained 
by torture, including those made by third persons (e.g. witnesses) and not 
only by defendants in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the exclusionary 
rule also concerns statements extracted in the same manner by public 
officials from another country.19 On the other hand, given the definition of 
torture contained in Article 1 of the UN Convention, the exclusionary rule 
15 See, GRAFFIN, Neil J. The legal consequences of ill-treating Detainees held 
for Police Questioning in Breach of Article 3 ECHR. European Journal of Cur-
rent Legal Issues, v. 20, n. 2, 2014, p. 4. 
16 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Adopted 
by General Assembly resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9th December 1975. Arti-
cle 12 of the Declaration states that “Any statement which is established to 
have been made as a result of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment may not be invoked as evidence against the person 
concerned or against any other person in any proceedings”.
17 See opinions of the Committee Against Torture (“CAT”) delivered in report-
ing procedure and referred to by PATTENDEN Rosemary. Admissibility in 
criminal proceedings of third party and real evidence obtained by methods 
prohibited by UNCAT. International Journal of Evidence and Proof, v. 10, n. 1. 
2006, p. 8, footnote 62. 
18 As reported by Giuliana Monina, different approach is taken by CAT in an 
individual complaint procedure and this approach also prevails in academic 
literature. See: MONINA, Giuliana. Article 15. Non-Admissibility of Evidence 
Obtained by Torture. In: NOWAK, Manfred; BIRK Moritz; MONINA Giuliana 
(org.). The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Its Optional Proto-
col. A Commentary. Oxford University Press 2019. pp. 437.
19 THIENEL Tobias, op. cit., pp. 356, 360.
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under its Article 15 does not apply to the conduct of private individuals. 
Private acts of torture would not be excluded pursuant to this provision.20 
Universal standard of protection of human rights is also created by 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights21. The ICCPR does not 
contain any general rules on admissibility of evidence. However, Article 
14 para. 3 (g) of the ICCPR provides for the right not to be compelled 
to testify against himself or to confess guilt. Thus, forced statements of 
a defendant shall not be admissible evidence. Furthermore, the Human 
Rights Committee derives a similar exclusionary rule from Article 7 of 
the Covenant. It seems to cover not only statements obtained by torture 
but also by other forms of cruel treatment.22
In conclusion, the Strasbourg Court challenges the fairness of 
any proceedings which make evidentiary use of statements obtained by 
public officials, both as a result of torture and other forms of conduct 
prohibited under Article 3 ECHR, regardless of the relevance of such 
impugned evidence to the determination of the facts of the case. In this 
respect, the Strasbourg standard seems more rigorous than the universal 
one defined in the UN Convention, the latter applying the exclusionary 
rule directly and unequivocally only to statements forced by torture. The 
European standard covers also real evidence obtained directly or indirectly 
as a result of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. However, the 
Court’s approach to real evidence obtained by ill-treatment that is not 
sufficiently severe to qualify as torture is less strict. When examining 
such cases, the Court assesses the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. 
20 SCHARF, Michael P. Tainted Provenance: When, If Ever, Should Torture Ev-
idence Be Admissible?, Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies. Working 
Paper 07-27, September 2007, p. 21.
21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by United 
Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966. Thereafter referred to 
as “ICCPR”. 
22 GENERAL COMMENT NO. 20: ARTICLE 7 (PROHIBITION OF TORTURE 
OR OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUN-
ISHMENT) adopted at the forty-fourth session (1992), para. 12; GENERAL 
COMMENT NO. 32, ARTICLE 14: RIGHT TO EQUALITY BEFORE COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS AND TO A FAIR TRIAL), adopted at the ninetieth ses-
sion, (2007), CCPR/C/GC/32. 
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2.  adMissibility of EvidEncE obtainEd by privatE individuals 
applying MEthods contrary to articlE 3 Echr. 
The procedures of some European countries allow fact-finding in a 
criminal trial based on the so-called private evidence, meaning documents, 
statements, or recordings made by private individuals outside criminal 
proceedings. Sometimes only “private” evidence gathered outside a 
criminal trial and for purposes other than the trial can be admitted.23 Some 
jurisdictions, including Poland, permit evidentiary use of information, 
e.g. recordings, collected by private individuals with the intention of 
using it later in criminal proceedings.24 Given the foregoing, the question 
posed in the title of this paper should be asked, namely whether the 
Strasbourg standards of fair trial allow the use in criminal proceedings of 
private evidence collected by methods violating the prohibition defined 
in Article 3 ECHR. Apparently, in order to provide the correct answer 
to this question two situations need to be distinguished. First, the use 
in a criminal trial of the so-called “find,” i.e. a piece of evidence, such 
as a recording containing statements extracted by torture or inhuman 
treatment, however, produced entirely without any connection with 
the trial, outside the trial, and for purposes other than the trial; and, 
second, the use in a criminal proceedings of information (recordings of 
statements) obtained by private individuals applying similar methods 
as those named above but with the intention of using them in the trial.
23 Article 393 § 3 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure as applicable until 
30th June 2015 stated that “All private documents prepared outside of the 
criminal proceedings and not for their purpose, including statements, publi-
cations, letters and notes, may be read out at the trial”.
24 The current wording of Article 393 § 3 of the CCP reads as follows: “All pri-
vate documents drawn up outside criminal proceedings, including statements, 
publications, letters and notes, may be read out at the trial”. However, due to 
ambiguous wording of Article 168a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is 
not clear whether this provision applies fully to private evidence obtained 
as a result of serious criminal acts. See: SOLODOV, Denis; SOLODOV, Ilia. 
Legal safeguards against involuntary criminal confessions in Poland and Rus-
sia. Revista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 6, n. 3, pp. 
1673-1676. On admissibility of private evidence in selected European coun-
tries, see: BOJAŃCZYK, Antoni. Dowód prywatny w postępowaniu karnym 
w perspektywie prawnoporównawczej. Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer Publisher, 
2011. pp. 21-177.
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2.1. Judgement in Ćwik v. Poland 
Until November 2020, this problem had not been solved in the 
European system of protection of human rights. Yet, based on some 
comments by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
or the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, they can be said to 
incline towards inadmissibility of evidence obtained using methods 
contrary to Article 3 ECHR, regardless of who has employed the prohibited 
methods.25 A review of the dissenting opinions of ECtHR judges to the 
Grand Chamber’s judgment on the absence of violation of Article 6 ECHR 
in the case of Gäfgen v. Germany leads to a similar conclusion.26 
The issue in question has been recently decided for the first time 
in the case of Ćwik v. Poland.27 The domestic court determined the facts 
of the case, inter alia, on the basis of a recorded “interrogation” of K.G. 
who, together with the applicant, had engaged in the unlawful practice 
of smuggling cocaine from the USA to Poland. K.G. and the applicant 
had come into conflict with other members of their organized crime 
group. That led to K.G.’s abduction by the other members of the group 
and torturing him to elicit information on the location of the smuggled 
cocaine and cash. In the course of K.G.s’ “interrogation” carried out in 
the presence of, but not only, the leader of the criminal group, A.H., 
and a M.W., and recorded at the instruction of L.P., K.G. disclosed the 
place where the cocaine and the cash had been concealed. K.G. was later 
released from the abductors by the police, who also secured the recording. 
The recording was then used as evidence in the criminal proceedings 
conducted against the applicant (Ćwik), who pleaded not guilty and refused 
to give explanations during the trial. The domestic court determined the 
facts on the basis of various pieces of evidence, including the testimony 
25 See: Comments by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe referred to in: PATTEN-
DEN, Rosemary. Admissibility in criminal proceedings of third party and real 
evidence obtained by methods prohibited by UNCAT. International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof, v. 10, n. 1. 2006. p. 12. 
26 ECtHR judgment, Gäfgen v. Germany: joint partly dissenting opinion of judg-
es Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, in particular para. 2 
of the opinion
27 ECtHR judgment of 5th November 2020, Ćwik v. Poland, appl. no. 31454/10. 
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of L.P. and M.W. “interrogating” K.G., as well as on a transcript of the 
recording, which, in the opinion of the court, constituted “an important 
item of evidence confirming the credibility of L.P. and M.W. with regard 
to K.G.’s and the applicant’s involvement in the cocaine business, as 
well as confirming the applicant’s guilt”.28 In the course of the criminal 
proceedings against the applicant, K.G. was not heard because he was 
hiding and his whereabouts could not be established. The domestic court 
which examined the appeal and the applicant’s pleas against evidentiary 
use of the recording of K.G.’s “interrogation” held that the exclusion of 
statements extracted by torture, as set forth in Article 171 § 7 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure,29 did not apply if coercive interrogation, as in the 
examined case, was conducted by private individuals.30 At this point, it 
needs to be clarified that in accordance with the Polish law applicable at 
the time, it was permitted to disclose during the trial all private documents 
produced outside the criminal proceedings and not for the purpose of 
those proceedings. 
In that case, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6 para. 1 ECHR 
and stated, simply put, that the current case-law standard, as discussed 
elsewhere in this paper, should also be applied to “private evidence.” 
Before moving on to assessing the Court’s view, it should be stressed that 
this judgment was delivered by the Chamber of the ECtHR. The Polish 
government did not avail itself of the opportunity to appeal against the 
judgment to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. Consequently, it became 
final on 5 February 2021. The judgment was handed down with a majority 
of 5:2 votes. Of course, the sole fact of majority voting does not undermine 
28 ECtHR judgment, Ćwik v. Poland, § 23.
29 This provision clearly states that “Explanations, testimonies and state-
ments made in circumstances precluding freedom of speech or obtained 
against the prohibitions mentioned in § 5 [i.e. prohibition to influence 
statements of a testifying person by means of force or illicit threat], may 
not constitute evidence”. 
30 Such interpretation of this provision was also presented in legal literature: 
JASIŃSKI, Wojciech. Nielegalnie uzyskane dowody w procesie karnym. W 
poszukiwaniu optymalnego rozwiązania. Wolters Kluwer Publishing, War-
saw 2019. pp. 581-582; RUSINEK, Michał. Zakazy odnoszące się do sposobu 
dowodzenia. In: SKORUPKA Jerzy (org.) System Prawa Karnego Procesowego. 
Dowody. Tom VIII, cz. 2, Wolters Kluwer Publisher. Warsaw 2019. p. 2229.
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the solidity of the judgment. However, it proves the discrepancy of views 
of Strasbourg judges on this extremely difficult problem. Despite strong 
arguments put forward in the judgment, it can hardly be regarded as 
determining and clarifying, in a firm and exhaustive manner, the standard 
on the admissibility of “private evidence”. The position of the majority 
of the Court’s judges seems to neglect certain vital arguments in favor 
of the opposite view. Regrettably, the joint dissenting opinion of the two 
judges who voted against ascertaining the violation of Article 6 para. 1 
ECHR in this case does not exhaust the argumentation, although it does 
outline the normative context behind their decision more broadly. 
The very essence of the Court’s opinion is expressed in Section 
89 of the judgement where the Court finds that the principle established 
in the case-law on the inadmissibility of statements extracted by a public 
official using methods contrary to Article 3 ECHR “is equally applicable 
to the admission of evidence obtained from a third party as a result of 
ill-treatment proscribed by Article 3 when such ill-treatment was inflicted 
by private individuals, irrespective of the classification of that treatment”. 
In the opinion of the Court, the domestic court failed to consider the 
fact that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the absolute 
prohibition. In the judgment, the Court emphasized that the protection 
against conduct proscribed under Article 3 ECHR is the state’s positive 
obligation, also when inflicted by private individuals. This assertion 
was supported by reference to multiple rulings on the state’s positive 
obligations, including procedural ones, arising from Article 3 ECHR.31 
Furthermore, the Court underlined that evidence obtained under 
torture should be excluded “to protect the integrity of the trial process, 
and, ultimately, the rule of law itself”. Quoting the Othman (Abu Qatada) 
v. The United Kingdom case, the ECtHR stated that “no legal system based 
on the rule of law can countenance the admission of evidence – however 
reliable – which has been obtained by such a barbaric practice as torture” 
and that “torture damages irreparably the trial process”.32 
All in all, the ECtHR refrained even from verifying the legitimacy 
of the other applicant’s complaint in respect to the fairness of his trial, 
31 ECtHR judgment Ćwik v. Poland, §§ 63-67. 
32 ECtHR judgment Ćwik v. Poland, § 74.
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i.e. one concerning failure to examine K.G., the victim of the torture, in 
the course of the proceedings. In the Court’s view, the very admission of 
the impugned transcript into evidence in the criminal proceedings against 
the applicant rendered the proceedings as a whole unfair, in breach of 
Article 6 para. 1 ECHR.33
Meanwhile, the dissenting judges referred to the definition of 
torture contained in Article 1 of the UN Convention, stressing that the 
exclusionary rule under Article 15 of the Convention applies only to 
acts which can be directly or indirectly attributed to public officials. 
Accordingly, it does not concern acts performed by private individuals. 
The dissenting judges also made references to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, which do not automatically exclude evidence obtained 
in violation of “internationally recognized human rights”, since their 
inadmissibility depends on whether (a) the violation casts substantial 
doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or (b) the admission of the 
evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity 
of the proceedings (Article 69.7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC). 
The dissenting opinion also highlights that restrictions of 
admissibility of evidence are an exception, hence they require a detailed 
justification, which, as a rule, is not needed for admission of evidence. 
Judges Wojtyczek and Pejchal also emphasized the significance of the 
principle of free assessment of evidence and linked it to the principle 
of free admission of evidence. Finally, both dissenting judges concluded 
that there were no grounds for the application of the same standards to 
evidence obtained through ill-treatment by private individuals and to 
evidence obtained by public officials. They supported this thesis by two 
arguments. First, for evidence obtained by public officials in violation of 
Article 3 ECHR, the risk of the unfairness of the proceedings comes from 
the possibility of using evidence which is false or fabricated. Such risk 
does not exist when the evidence is gathered without any involvement of 
public authorities. Second, unlike in case of applying exclusionary rule to 
tainted evidence produced by public officials, the extension of this rule to 
“private evidence” obtained in similar circumstances does not reinforce 
the protection against ill-treatment. Thus, “the acceptance of evidence 
33 ECtHR judgment Ćwik v. Poland, §§ 91-93.
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like that in question in the instant case does not encourage torture by 
private parties”.34 In addition, the judges stressed that the case should 
be approached differently if the recording had been used in the criminal 
proceedings against K.G. Due to protection of the right to remain silent, 
this type of evidence should be considered inadmissible. 
2.2. CritiCal remarks to the Judgment of the eCthr in Ćwik v. Poland
The position expressed by the ECtHR in the case can hardly be 
shared. In general, the view of dissenting judges should be endorsed. 
However, as pointed out elsewhere, both the view expressed by the majority 
of the Court as well as the position formulated in the dissenting opinion 
do not seem to make allowances for all arguments and circumstances 
which should be considered when establishing a standard for fair criminal 
proceedings in which a private recording of statements extracted by 
torture or inhuman treatment was admitted as evidence. 
The majority who voted in favor of the violation of Article 6 
ECHR did not attach sufficient importance to the fact that the recording 
had objectively existed before the proceedings against the applicant were 
instigated and was not used in proceedings against the person subjected to 
torture. The recording had been made outside of the criminal proceedings 
and not for the purpose thereof. Moreover, and crucially, it was produced 
without any connection with the activities of public officials. Obviously, 
the prohibition of torture is unquestionable and constitutes a mandatory 
rule (ius cogens) of international law. In other words, it is absolute and 
cannot be derogated from.35 The status of ius cogens is sometimes also 
conferred on the exclusionary rule contained in Article 15 of the UN 
Convention,36 although the question remains controversial. At the same 
34 ECtHR judgment Ćwik v. Poland, § 12 of the dissenting opinion.
35 See, however, a discussion on its scope and attempts to find some arguments 
against the absoluteness of this prohibition in certain, exceptional circum-
stances – a discussion following Gäfgen v. Germany judgment: GREER, Ste-
ven. Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treat-
ment Really ‘Absolute’ in International Human Rights Law? Human Rights 
Law Review 2015. pp. 1-37. (advance access published on January 30, 2015). 
36 See, PATTENDEN, Rosemary. Admissibility in criminal proceedings of 
third party and real evidence obtained by methods prohibited by UNCAT. 
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time, the universal definition of torture in the UN Convention is linked 
to acts, or at least the acquiesce, of public officials or other person acting 
in an official capacity. 
The main argument put forward in the Ćwik v. Poland judgment 
was that “torture evidence” devastates the integrity of the trial process 
and, consequently, the rule of law itself. This view, expressed in the 
Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom case, deserves full support. 
However, in this case, it was applied by the ECtHR to evidence obtained as 
a result of treatment defined as torture in Article 1 of the UN Convention 
Against Torture (CAT), i.e. treatment “inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity”. As clearly transpires from paragraph 266 
of the Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom judgment, the Court 
found support for its reasoning in Article 15 CAT, which, no doubts, 
applies only to evidence obtained by torture as defined in Article 1 of this 
Convention. Moreover, in this case, the applicant’s deportation could be 
assessed as silent acceptance of the known and widely applied practice 
of torture administered by Jordanian public officials towards witnesses 
and defendants in criminal proceedings. It would mean the tolerance 
for intentional ill-treatment inflicted by state officials for the purpose 
of gathering evidence to be used in the trial. 
Unfortunately, in Ćwik v. Poland one cannot find convincing 
arguments why the same exclusionary rule shall be automatically applied to 
a private recording produced by members of the organized crime without 
any intention to use it as evidence in the future criminal proceedings while 
such a recording was found by chance by the police. Relying solely on the 
ius cogens character of torture prohibition is not sufficient here since in 
international law it relates to torture as defined by Article 1 CAT. Thus, 
the only convincing argument could be based on the standard of positive 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof, v. 10, n. 1. 2006. p. 8, and the de-
cision of the Committee Against Torture referred to therein: COMMITTEE 
AGAINST TORTURE decision of 21 November 2002, P.E. v. France, Comm. 
No. 193/2001, U.N. Doc. A/58/44, at 135 (CAT 2002), para. 6.3.; See, how-
ever, the opposite view: SCHARF, Michael P. Tainted Provenance: When, If 
Ever, Should Torture Evidence Be Admissible?, Case Research Paper Series in 
Legal Studies. Working Paper 07-27, September 2007. pp. 23-24. 
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obligations of state-parties of the ECHR to provide effective protection 
against all forms of ill-treatment, including those administrated by private 
individuals. However, as will be argued further on, admission of the said 
recording as evidence in criminal proceedings cannot be assessed as an 
act of tolerance for ill-treatment inflicted between private individuals. 
In its judgment in Ćwik v. Poland, the Court rightly emphasized 
that the prohibition set forth in Article 3 ECHR had previously been 
referred in the case-law not only to public officials but also to private 
individuals. Particularly, in cases concerning extradition or expulsion, 
the Court examines whether transferring a person to another jurisdiction 
may expose him or her to a real risk of maltreatment by private persons.37 
Therefore, states parties to the ECHR are not only obliged to refrain from 
conduct referred to in Article 3 ECHR but also take positive measures to 
protect persons subject to their jurisdictions from ill-treatment, as well as 
by other private individuals.38 The scope of the state’s positive obligations is 
not only confined to prevention but also covers an appropriate procedural 
response to ill-treatment of a private person by another.39 Such obligations 
are met by the implementation of effective prosecution of such conduct. 
States must also evolve their legal systems in a way that does not foster 
tolerance of private persons’ conduct contrary to Article 3 ECHR.40 
37 See, in particular, ECtHR [Grand Chamber] judgment of 29 April 1997, 
H.L.R. v. France, appl. no. 24573/94, § 33-44. In this case the risk of the appli-
cant’s ill-treatment, if deported to Colombia, emanated from drug traffickers. 
The Court did not find a violation of Article 3 of the Convention since in its 
opinion no real risk of ill-treatment was established. See also the judgment of 
the ECtHR of 16th June 2016, R.D. v. France, appl. no. 34648/14, §§ 43-45. 
38 See, inter alia, ECtHR judgment of 31st May 2007, Šečić  v.  Croatia, appl. 
no. 40116/02, § 53. Protection from ill-treatment administrated by private 
actors is also considered as part of “positive obligations” stemming from 
Article 16 of the CAT. Failure to act by the police officers, although they 
had been informed of the immediate risk of ill-treatment that a person was 
facing, is implying ‘acquiescence’ within the meaning of Article 16 of the 
Convention: COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE decision of 21 November 
2002, Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, Comm. No. 161/2000, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 (2002), para. 9.2.
39 See inter alia ECtHR judgment of 25th June 2009, Beganović v. Croatia, appl. 
no. 46423/06, §§ 66 and 69.
40 ECtHR judgment of 23rd September 1998, A. v. UK, appl. no. 25599/94, § 22. 
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In the context of the case-law at hand, a question arises of whether 
the use of evidence obtained outside criminal proceedings (prior to 
their instigating) by private individuals as a result of ill-treatment may 
be perceived as the establishment by the state of a legal framework for 
tolerating the collection of evidence by private individuals in violation of 
Article 3 ECHR, and thus for tolerating such conduct in general. Before 
responding to this question, however, it should be noted that the situation 
discussed above should not be treated on a par with exposure of a person 
to ill-treatment by private individuals as a result of handing that person 
over to another jurisdiction (country). Should this be the case, the state 
party to the ECHR has the means to prevent the real and prospective ill-
treatment. In contrast, if the investigative or judicial authorities obtain 
already existing evidence containing a recorded statement by a person 
subjected to ill-treatment, the implications are quite different: the state 
has no possibility of preventing a violation of Article 3 of the Convention; 
it may merely fulfil its positive obligation to prosecute the torturer.
Returning to the obligation to develop a legal system that does 
not foster tolerance of conduct violating Article 3 ECHR, the following 
conclusions must be drawn. It seems that tolerance of ill-treatment would 
occur if domestic law allowed admission of private evidence collected 
through such treatment for the purpose of criminal proceedings, i.e. when 
private individuals act intentionally to make evidentiary use of statements 
obtained through inflicting violence. In the author’s view, inadmissibility 
of such evidence in a criminal trial can be justified on grounds of Article 
3 ECHR. The opposing view that the exclusionary rule applies exclusively 
to evidence obtained by public officials would lead to an unacceptable 
conclusion that the investigative and judicial authorities may acquiesce to 
or tolerate the methods of collecting private evidence in violation of Article 
3 ECHR in order to use the evidence later on in criminal proceedings 
as authorized by a competent judicial body. To cite a metaphor used in 
the judgment Jalloh v. Germany, in this way brutality would be afforded 
“the cloak of law” by the judicial authority (the court) which admitted 
the evidence, being aware that probative statements had been extracted 
in a disgraceful manner just for the purpose of the criminal trial. The 
admission of such evidence in the criminal trial could be compared to the 
“acquiescence of a public official” within Article 1 of the UN Convention 
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against Torture. In the case in question, the acquiescence would come 
from the court admitting the statements extracted in such a manner for 
the purposes of the trial. This would stand in contradiction with the 
state party’s obligation of taking positive action to protect persons from 
treatment violating Article 3 ECHR and suffered from private individuals.
What raises doubts, however, is the position contained in the 
judgment in the case of Ćwik v. Poland, demanding the same approach 
to a situation when a tainted evidence (recording of statements) is 
produced outside the criminal proceedings, before its initiation, and, 
more importantly, for other purposes. The recording referred to in the 
case was a typical “find.” It had objectively existed before the launch of 
the criminal proceedings against the applicant Grzegorz Ćwik; it had 
been secured in the course of lawful action of the Police (search); and 
its use in the criminal trial could not in any way reduce K.G.’s protection 
against torture or inhuman treatment. On the other hand, as rightly noted 
in the dissenting opinion accompanying the judgment, refusal to use this 
evidence in the trial could not have enhanced K.G.’s protection from 
inhuman or degrading treatment by the members of the criminal group 
who “interrogated” him. At the same time, one should bear in mind that 
the admission of the recording as evidence in the criminal proceedings 
increased chances of effective prosecution of organized crime. As follows 
from the Court’s judgement, the torturers identified in the recording were 
prosecuted in another criminal proceedings, which needs to be considered 
an adequate procedural response and the fulfilment of Poland’s positive 
obligations towards K.G. arising from Article 3 of the Convention.
However, arguments expressed in the Court’s justification of 
the judgment deserve one more critical remark. The Court combined 
the question of the admissibility of evidence with the assessment of its 
reliability. This approach, also adopted in many other rulings of the ECtHR, 
is at least debatable. The assessment of the admissibility of evidence is 
performed a priori; in Poland and some European countries it is formal 
in character. It should not entail the examination of the reliability of 
evidence. If the two areas are mixed (admissibility of evidence and 
assessment of the reliability of evidence), it may have an adverse effect 
on the procedural rights of the parties, which should naturally participate 
in the taking of evidence admitted in the trial and should be able to either 
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challenge or support its reliability at this procedural stage.41 Still, in some 
legal systems, the stage of admission of evidence is non-adversarial, 
meaning that it is based on the judicial authority recognizing or rejecting 
a motion of evidence, frequently in a written form and outside the public 
hearing. Meanwhile, the justification of the judgement in Ćwik v. Poland, 
especially Section 74, leads to the conclusion that in the opinion of the 
ECtHR the recording of “private torture” must be excluded as evidence 
because it is unreliable. The ECtHR stated that the use of such evidence 
automatically makes the criminal proceedings against the applicant unfair 
without taking into consideration whether other evidence admitted by the 
domestic court was fully legal and sufficient for justifying the applicant’s 
conviction. In effect, if the exclusion of tainted evidence from the trial, as 
argued elsewhere, may not, in any case increase protection of the author 
of the recorded statements from ill-treatment, and the important argument 
for inadmissibility of this evidence is its unreliability, then the domestic 
court was right to consider it admissible and proceed with the assessment 
of its reliability. It should be underlined that the ECtHR does not lose the 
possibility of reviewing the fairness of the criminal proceedings due to the 
fact that the conviction was based on evidence declared admissible but, 
at the same time, obtained in circumstances jeopardising its reliability. 
In numerous cases in which the guilt of the sentenced person was 
established on the basis of testimonies of crown witnesses or incognito 
depositions, the Court did not focus on the admissibility of evidence 
but merely indicated the necessity of a careful, thorough examination 
of such depositions, taking into account their unique character, as well 
as their importance for fact-finding.42 Such an approach, known as “the 
41 This aspect is rightly noticed in: JASIŃSKI, Wojciech. Nielegalnie uzyskane 
dowody w procesie karnym. W poszukiwaniu optymalnego rozwiązania. 
Wolters Kluwer Publishing, Warsaw 2019. p. 170. Of course, this problem 
does not exist if the national law unequivocally prohibits admission of evi-
dence collected in violation of the law. 
42 ECtHR decision of 25th May 2004, Arnold G. Cornelis v. the Netherlands, appl. 
no. 994/03 (with reference to the use of testimony of a witness granted im-
munity); ECtHR judgment of 11th February 2002, Visser v. the Netherlands, 
appl. no. 26668/95, §§ 43-52 (with reference to the statement of an anony-
mous witness). However, this approach was also criticized in the literature: 
TRECHSEL, Stefan; SUMMERS, Sarah, J. Human Rights in Criminal Proceed-
ings, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006. p. 313. 
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sole or decisive rule”, is frequently applied by the Court not only in 
cases involving anonymous witnesses or crown witnesses but also with 
reference to untested evidence (hearsay witnesses). With regard to this 
type of evidence, it is underlined by the ECtHR that “its admission will 
not automatically result in a breach of Article 6 § 1 [of the Convention]. 
At the same time, where a conviction is based solely or decisively on the 
evidence of absent witnesses, the Court must subject the proceedings 
to the most searching scrutiny.”43 Therefore sufficient counterbalancing 
factors should be in place, including measures that permit a fair and 
proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence44. 
A similar holistic approach is also applied to evidence obtained 
in breach of respect for private life. When called upon to assess the case 
in which a secret recording gathered in the course of a covert operation 
was admitted as evidence, the Court did not focus on its admissibility but 
on the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. The ECtHR underlined the 
necessity to examine “whether the applicant was given the opportunity 
of challenging the authenticity of the evidence and of opposing its use”.45 
Furthermore, it emphasized that “the quality of the evidence must be 
taken into consideration, including whether the circumstances in which 
it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy.”46 
Finally, what is of crucial importance here, the standard of 
“general assessment of fairness”, although with extreme caution, is 
also applied by the ECtHR to cases in which domestic courts relied on 
real evidence obtained by inhuman or degrading treatment47 as well as 
43 ECtHR judgment of 15 December 2011, Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The United 
Kingdom, appl. nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, § 147.
44 Ibidem.
45 ECtHR [Grand Chamber] judgment of 10th March 2009, Bykov v. Russia, 
appl. no. 4378/02, § 90. The same approach was applied in many subsequent 
cases. See, for instance: ECtHR judgment of 3 March 2016, Prade v. Germany, 
appl. no. 7215/10, §§ 33-35; ECtHR judgment of 5 December 2019, Ham-
bardzumyan v. Armenia, appl. no. 43478/11, §§ 75-77. 
46 Ibidem. 
47 ECtHR judgment Jalloh v. Germany, §§ 106-107. The ECtHR stated: “It cannot 
be excluded that on the facts of a particular case the use of evidence obtained 
by intentional acts of ill-treatment not amounting to torture will render the 
trial against the victim unfair, irrespective of the seriousness of the offence 
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on real evidence gathered thanks to the statements forced by inhuman 
treatment of an interrogated suspect.48 
Looking again at the circumstances of the case of Ćwik v. Poland, it 
should be concluded that since the evidentiary use of the recording could 
not have had any impact on K.G.’s protection from torture or any other 
forms of ill-treatment, emphasis should have been laid on the assessment 
of the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. After all, the transcript 
of the recording admitted in evidence was intended to corroborate the 
testimonies of the members of the criminal group who had been involved 
in the recorded “interrogation,” and K.G. was not heard in the course of the 
proceedings. Accordingly, the key issue in the light of Article 6 ECHR was 
not the admission of the evidence but rather the review of the fairness of 
the criminal proceedings as a whole, also in view of the manner in which 
the domestic court assessed the evidence in the form of a transcript of 
the recording and its relevance to the determination of the facts.
To sum up, the automatic application of the exclusionary rule 
concerning statements extracted by ill-treatment by public officials to 
evidence obtained in similar circumstances by private individuals for 
purposes other than criminal proceedings is not substantiated by the 
necessity to respect the standard set by Article 3 ECHR. Moreover, if such 
evidence is used in proceedings against a third party, not being subjected 
to ill-treatment (like in Ćwik v. Poland case), its admissibility cannot 
be questioned by invoking the protection of a defendant against self-
incrimination and his or her right to silence. This position does not limit 
the Court’s competence to examine compliance of criminal proceedings 
with the requirements of a fair trial. The Court should examine the 
fairness of the proceedings as a whole, with particular emphasis laid on 
allegedly committed, the weight attached to the evidence and the opportuni-
ties which the victim had to challenge its admission and use at his trial. […]. 
In the present case, the general question whether the use of evidence ob-
tained by an act qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment automatically 
renders a trial unfair can be left open.”
48 ECtHR judgment Gäfgen v. Germany, §§ 173-188. See also: LAI HO, Hock. The 
Fair Trial Rationale for Excluding Wrongfully Obtained Evidence, In: GLESS 
Sabine; RICHTER Thomas (org.). Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial? 
A Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary Rules. Ius Gentium: Comparative 
Perspectives on Law and Justice 74. Springer Open, pp. 285-288. 
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the reliability of admitted “private evidence” and its role in establishing 
the circumstances of the case. 
Nevertheless, the above assertion does not lead to the overall 
approval of arguments put forward in the dissenting opinion. First, it 
appears to reinforce the conviction that the universal standard arising 
from Articles 1 and 15 of the UN Convention, as well as from the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), is the one which should 
have a limiting effect on the development of the European standard of 
a fair trial in terms of admission of evidence obtained as a result of ill-
treatment. In fact, even though the Court should interpret the ECHR with 
regard to universal standards, in the view of the lack of a legal definition 
of torture in the conventions of the Council of Europe, the Court is 
entitled to assume a higher level of protection against ill-treatment than 
the one set in the universal human rights protection system. As already 
mentioned, even a cursory analysis of the ECtHR’s judgments in terms of 
state’s positive obligations to ensure protection against ill-treatment leads 
to a conclusion that the relevant Strasbourg standard is currently stricter 
and, in the specific circumstances described above, may be directly applied 
to acts of private individuals as well. Consequently, the idea expressed in 
the dissenting opinion that the scope of the prohibition of torture does 
not go beyond the provisions of the UN Convention,49 seems to question 
the existing trend in the case-law of the ECtHR.50 Therefore, considering 
this standard of case-law, I believe that in specific circumstances, i.e. 
when private individuals ill-treat a person to illicit statements with the 
intention to subsequently use them in a criminal trial, the exclusionary 
rule discussed in the first part of this paper should apply.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the liability of the state 
for torture inflicted by private individuals is also applicable to a limited 
extent under the UN Convention. This is the case when such acts are 
committed “with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.”51 The authors of the dissenting 
49 ECtHR judgment Ćwik v. Poland, § 4 of the dissenting opinion.
50 See ECtHR judgments indicated in footnotes 37-40.
51 For interpretation of this term, see: ZACH, Gerrit. Article 1. Definition of 
Torture. In: NOWAK, Manfred; BIRK Moritz; MONINA Giuliana (org.). The 
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opinion highlighted it in the last paragraph of Section 9 thereof. They 
find that even if the acquiescence to torture could be expressed ex post 
facto, this type of acquiescence did not occur in the examined case. This 
opinion is by far correct, yet at the same time, it supports the idea that the 
acts of private persons in violation of Article 3 ECHR (and simultaneously 
aimed to obtain admissible evidence for the purpose of a criminal trial) 
may be considered in terms of the creation of a legal framework that does 
not guarantee adequate protection against ill-treatment in this respect. 
Reference to a ruling of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECHCC)52 in the dissenting opinion is not fully 
convincing, either. It is necessary to keep in mind the context of the line of 
thought contained in the decision of the ECHCC. By relying on teleological 
interpretation, the ECHCC argued for a broader understanding of the 
exception from the exclusionary rule contained in the last sentence of Article 
15 of the UN Convention. Yet, its intention was to enable broader use of 
evidence forced by torture in the proceedings against persons accused of 
the torture. Thus, the reason to apply such an interpretation was to allow 
more effective prosecution of the torturers.53 Still, even this approach was 
met with criticism.54 In this context, the cited § 75 of the ECHCC’s decision 
can hardly be recognized as supporting the dissenting opinion. 
It is also noteworthy that, when recalling applicable international 
standards, the dissenting judges pointed to a rather general exclusionary 
rule expressed in Article 69.7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which does 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Its Optional Protocol. A Com-
mentary. Oxford University Press 2019. pp. 61-62.
52 Thereafter referred to as “ECHCC”.
53 ECHCC (TRIAL CHAMBER) decision of 5th February 2016, case no. 002/19-
09-2007/ECCC/TC. §§ 71-78. See also attempts to find a flexible interpreta-
tion to the exception to the exclusionary rule in order to make prosecution of 
perpetrators of torture and their superiors more effective: SCHARF, Michael 
P. Tainted Provenance: When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence Be Admis-
sible?, Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies. Working Paper 07-27, Sep-
tember 2007. pp. 19-27. 
54 MONINA, Giuliana. Article 15. Non-Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by 
Torture. In: NOWAK, Manfred; BIRK Moritz; MONINA Giuliana (org.). The 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Its Optional Protocol. A Com-
mentary. Oxford University Press 2019. pp. 439-440.
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not imply the automatic inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation 
of internationally recognized human rights. However, at least the doctrine 
finds that the content of this provision determines that statements forced 
by torture or other forms of cruel treatment are inadmissible.55 Note 
that the definition of torture contained in Article 7.2(e) of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC does not imply that this kind of treatment occurs 
only if inflicted by a public official or at his or her consent. However, 
the substantive definition of torture is determined by the scope of the 
ICC’s personal jurisdiction.56 
The remaining arguments advanced in the dissenting opinion are 
worthy of approval. They refer to the circumstances of the case, i.e. to 
the fact that this was a piece of private evidence in the form of recorded 
statements obtained through inhuman treatment, albeit outside of and for 
purposes other than the criminal proceedings. The dissenting judges did 
not analyze any other situation discussed in this paper, namely the forcing 
of evidence by private individuals with the intention to subsequently 
use it in criminal proceedings, since such circumstances did not occur 
in the case of Ćwik v. Poland. Nevertheless, the firm assertion that the 
definition of torture does not go beyond the provisions of the CAT permits 
a conclusion that the dissenting judges do not extend the exclusionary 
rule to acts of private individuals, regardless of the circumstances and 
the purpose for which the evidence was obtained. This interpretation 
of the dissenting opinion is further supported by the judges’ search for 
grounds for non-admission of evidence forced by “private torture” in 
the proceedings against the tortured person in the general obligation to 
respect the right of protection against self-incrimination rather than in 
the prohibition contained in Article 3 ECHR.57 
55 KUCZYŃSKA, Hanna. Prawo dowodowe w postępowaniu przed Międzynaro-
dowym Trybunałem Karnym. In: SKORUPKA Jerzy (org.) System Prawa Kar-
nego Procesowego. Dowody. Tom VIII, cz. 2, Wolters Kluwer Publisher. War-
saw 2019. pp. 1727-1728.
56 PATTENDEN, Rosemary. Admissibility in criminal proceedings of third par-
ty and real evidence obtained by methods prohibited by UNCAT. Internation-
al Journal of Evidence and Proof, v. 10, n. 1. 2006. pp. 9-10.
57 ECtHR judgment of Ćwik v. Poland, § 12 of the dissenting opinion. It states as 
follows: “In any event, protection against self-incrimination does not justify 
per se a general exclusionary rule disqualifying evidence obtained through 
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conclusions
Undoubtedly, the ECtHR judgment in the case of Ćwik v. Poland 
will mark the beginning of a new chapter in the discussion of the European 
standard that should apply to admission in criminal proceedings as evidence 
of statements forced by torture or inhuman or degrading treatment by 
private individuals. Although the position of the Court is unambiguous, 
one may not overlook the solid arguments expressed in the dissenting 
opinion. It seems that this was precisely the case in the studied judgment. 
The majority in favor of the violation of Article 6 para. 1 ECHR failed 
to consider all possible aspects of obtaining the evidence. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to find that the pertinent European standard in this 
area is in statu nascendi. 
The article adopts a critical view of the judgment of the ECtHR. 
The Court did not attach adequate importance to the fact that the recording 
of “private torture”, used as evidence in the domestic proceedings, 
had been made outside of and for purposes other than the criminal 
proceedings. Furthermore, it was admitted into criminal proceedings 
conducted against a third person, not against the victim of torture. In 
my view, these circumstances should render such evidence admissible. 
Consequently, the Court should not have questioned its admissibility 
but rather assessed the fairness of the criminal proceedings as a whole, 
also taking into account (i) the extent to which the defendant had been 
able to challenge the reliability of the evidence (the transcript of the 
recording to be precise), (ii) whether the domestic court had examined 
the evidence with reasonable care and (iii) what the role of the evidence 
was in fact-finding. The Court was in a position to make full use of well-
established case-law concerning the assessment of the fairness of the 
criminal proceedings in which untenable evidence had been used, i.e. 
“the sole or decisive evidence doctrine.” 
However, evidence obtained through “private torture” or other 
forms of ill-treatment, i.e. collected by the same vile methods by private 
individuals, albeit for the purpose of criminal proceedings, should be 
ill-treatment of one person, if this evidence is to be used in proceedings 
against another person.” 
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treated differently. In my view, this different approach is necessitated 
by the requirement of the state to meet its positive obligations pursuant 
to Article 3 ECHR. 
Finally, I am convinced that statements forced by any form of 
ill-treatment, also administrated by private individuals, can never be used 
against a defendant being a victim of this ill-treatment. An opposing view 
would violate the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination. 
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